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Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio WHETHER ULTIMATE REALITY is to be conceived as a personal God or an impersonal principle somehow at work in the world is an issue which tends to divide the major world religions into opposing camps. Furthermore, even within a given religion philosophers and theologians may differ on how God or Ultimate Reality is to be conceived. Within Vedantic Hinduism, for example, SaIikara and Ramanuja are clearly in opposition on this point even though they share the same basic world view in so many other respects. Likewise, Christian philosophers and theologians have through the centuries disagreed over this issue (e.g., the deeper reality of God in the thought of Thomas Aquinas and Meister Eckhart). At least one of the underlying philosophical issues, moreover, seems to be the question of infinity. If Ultimate Reality is truly transcendent or infinite, i.e., beyond human comprehension, then it cannot simultaneously be personal. For, to be a person would seem to involve being a relational and thus finite reality, one whose identity is fixed by relation to other persons. Ultimate Reality may indeed take on the appearance of personhood' for the religious devotee. But in itself it must be beyond the personal in order to remain infinite, in the words of the Chandogya Upanishad, "one without a second".l
In this article I will first review the rival positions of Sailkara and Ramanuja on this point and then pass to a consideration of the thought of two contemporary Christian theologians, Robert Neville and myself, in ' recently published books. I will indicate how Neville's position bears some limited resemblance to that of Sailkara just as mine more closely resembles that of Ramanuja. In any event, my deeper purpose here will be first to illuminate the problem of attributing infinity to God or whatever else is considered to be Ultimate Reality and then, in setting forth my own position, to indicate how one might be able· to resolve that problem by reconceiving infinity as a nondual reality in a special sense, namely, as an immanent activity within entities rather than as some kind of entity in its own right. For, thus understood, it can be represented as something that is necessarily both itself and not itself at the same time.
To begin, then, if one accepts the idea that Brahman is infinite, thatis, numerically "one without a second", then SaIikara appears to be right in maintaining that there must be two distinct standpoints with respect example, has the following definition of a body in his commentary on the BrahmliSutras: "Any entity that a sentient being is able completely to control and support for its own purpose, and the essential nature of which is entirely subservient to that self, is its body". 5 But, given such a definition, the independent reality of the created entity is quite ambiguous. It appears to be simply a "mode" (priikiira) of the divine being; its only meaning or value is to be a finite~ manifestation of the transcendent reality of Brahman. 6 On the, other hand, if one argues that the created entity, e. g., an individual self, is sufficiently independent of Brahman to make its own decision in line with its specific karma or fate, albeit with the "permission" of Brahman, 7 then the reality or ontological independence of the created entity is assured but Brahman is no longer "one without a second". It is rather one among many. Even though it is clearly the Highest Self, it is not the Absolute Self. For it shares existence with finite selves who likewise, at least to some extent, control their own existence and activity. Admittedly, these other entities are dependent upon Brahman for that same· existence and activity in that they constitute Brahman's "body." But, just as the human body and soul together make up the composite reality of an organism, so
Brahman would seem to be only a part, though admittedly the controlling part, of the composite reality which is Brahman plus the world of Nature and of individual selves.
It would seem, then, that, given the conventional understanding of Brahman as infinite, Sailkara presents the inore logical case. All appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, there can be only one reality. Brahman, for example, is conventionally described as saccidlinanda (being, consciousness, bliss), i.e. more as a state of being than an entity, such a perfect state of being must somehow really exist; it must bee the de facto experience of Atman or the Supreme Self. Otherwise, the claim that saccidlinanda really exists could readily be dismissed as illusory, pure wish-fulfilment on the part of unhappy human beings. Similarly within the Christian tradition, while God is no doubt qualitatively superior to creatures, it does not follow that God is for that same reason infinite in the sense discussed above. ,For, as long as creatures exist who subjectively exercise some of the perfections objectively possessed by God, then God must be said to share existence with these creatures and thus is not "one without a second". By their very existence, creatures limit the infinity of God even though they exist only as reflections of the divine being and perfection.
Thus the distinction between qualitative and quantitative understandings of the infinite cannot be sustained under careful scrutiny. Logically, the qualitative understanding of the infinite has to be grounded in a quantitative understanding of the infinite as numerically "one without a second" . What is presupposed here, of course, is that the Infinite is somehow an entity: for Sailkara, the Absolute Self; for Ramanuja, the Highest Self; for Christian theologians, God as the Supreme Being. On the other hand, if the infinity of God or Brahman were rethought in strictly nonentitative terms, namely, as the reality of an all-comprehensive activity, then the relationship between Brahman (or God) and finite entities might well be established on a new basis.
What do I mean, however, by the term "an all-comprehensive activity"? My supposition is that entities exist both in themselves and in dynamic relation to one another only by virtue of an underlying activity which serves as the ontologi~al ground for their existence and activity. 9 Every entity, accordingly, is dualdimensional. . There is its underlying ontological ground and its existence as an entity in virtue of that same ground. lO As I see it, this could well be the basis for a new understanding of the much controverted notion of non-duality in the Vedanta tradition. That is, non-duality does not exist in the first place between an infinite entity and finite entities, but rather between the grounding activity at work within an entity and the entity itself as an existing reality. For they are not simply identical; the grounding activity is not an entity, and the entity is other than the grounding activity. At the same time they are not-two since only together, namely, as grounding activity and that which exists in virtue of the grounding Infinity and the Logic of Non-Dualism 41 activity, are they one concrete reality.
This grounding activity, moreover, is infinite because it serves as the ontological ground for literally everything that exists. It is, accordingly, not limited by its activity in any single entity. Rather, it transcends them all since it is their common ground or source of existence and activity. Whereas entities are inevitably limited or defined by their relations to one another, this grounding activity is strictly unlimited and· therefore infinite since it has no rival. In the words of the Chandogya Upanishad, it is "one without a second". aut it is "one without a second" as an activity rather than as an entity. An infinite entity by definition eliminates the possibility of other entities besides itself which really exist. An infinite activity, on the contrary, only makes sense in terms of many entities in dynamic interrelation. The only reason for an infinite activity to exist is, in other words, to empower entities to exist both in themselves and in relation to one another as members of a common wodd.
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What I am arguing here, accordingly, is that a distinction should be made between Brahman and Atman within the Vedantic tradition and between the act of being and God in the Christian tradition. Brahman and its counterpart· in the Christian tradition, the act of being, are to be considered infinite because they are two names for one and the same ontological reality, namely, an underlying activity which brings into existence and relates to one another all the entities (both divine and creaturely) that Similarly, in the Christian tradition, one should distinguish between God, the individual creature, and the act of being common to them both which links them as Creator and creature within a common world.
In The Divine Matrix, I devoted a chapter to an analysis of the "Great Sayings" in the Upanishads and to a somewhat more detailed analysis of the writings of SaiIkara and Ramanuja, all in the light of this new understanding of the Infinite as an underlying activitr; rather than as a transcendent entity. 3 In the remaining pages of this article, accordingly, I will focus on the writings of two contemporary Christian theologians, namely, Robert Neville of Boston University and myself, in which this notion of the Infinite as an underlying activity rather than as a transcendent entity comes to the fore in the analysis of the God-world relationship from a Christian perspective. I will offer a brief summary of our two positions and then indicate how in a curious way we reflect the different stances taken by Sailkara and. Ramanuja on the reality of Brahman/Atman.
In Behind the Masks of God, Neville argues that every entity is a "harmony" of essential and conditional features, i.e., of featur,es which distinguish it from other entities and of features which link it to other entities. 14 He then adds: Given the existence of two such entities, each with its own harmony of essential and conditional features, there must be an ontologial ground of mutual togetherness in which each with both essential and conditional features faces the other with both essential and conditional features. I propose that this ground is ontological creativity, creativity of the very being of all things insofar as they are together in any sense whatever. 15 Finally, he also notes that ontological creativity "is the presence of the wholly transcendent God beyond God creating the determinate creatures of the earth but without determinate character of divinity apart from creating." 16 This somewhat cryptic reference to God Neville spells out in a later book in the following manner. The doctrine of creation out of nothing (ex nihilo) has three components; the creative source, the creative act, and the created product. The created product is not only the world of finite entities but the determinate reality of God as their creator. God, in other words, moves from pure indeterminacy to determinate reality in creating the world. The creative act is the ontological creativity referred to above. Finally, the creative source is God as wholly indeterminate apart from creation. Neville's reasoning here is that, if God were a determinate reality apart from creation, then one would have to postulate still another reality beyond God which would provide the ontological reason for God's determinateness apart from creation. Ultimate reality, in other words, must be intrinsically indeterminate; for otherwise one is always faced with the question how it became determinate. 17 Neville's conception of the God-world relationship is, accordingly, in some ways close to that of SaIikara. Neville argues that God· as creative source is purely indeterminate; in that respect, God as creative source is akin to SaIikara's notion of Brahman. Likewise, Neville argues that God is creator or a determinate reality only through interaction with creatures, somewhat the way that SaiIkara arg.ues that Brahman is manifest as ISvara (Lord) only in interaction with human beings in search of an explanation for the origin of reality. On the other hand, unlike Sailkara, Neville postulates the real existence of finite entities apart from Brahman as the indeterminate source of reality and, above all, the real existence of a universal grounding activity which he calls ontological creativity (as opposed to SaiIkara's more ambivalent position on the status and function of miiyii).
My own position is certainly more in line with orthodox Christian theology and l possibly more in line with the personalistic theism of Ramanuja. For I argue that the ontological creativity or grounding activity at work within and among the entities of this world does not emanate from a totally unknown source as Neville claims but from God in terms of the divine nature, that which makes God to be God, even apart from creation. Even God as a personal being or entitative reality, in other words, requires a grounding activity in order to exist; but this grounding activity, as I see it, is the divine nature. It is, so to speak, the hidden dimension of God just as the grounding activity is the hidden dimension of the being or entitative reality of every created entity. Thus, while Neville is correct in saying that only something indeterminate can explain what is determinate, that indeterminate reality is not completely unknown. It can be identified as the divine nature, that which, first of all, makes God to be God and then secondly, through the act of creation, that which makes all creatures both to be themselves and to exist in relation to one another and to God. 18 The possible affinity of my scheme with the thought of Ramanuja consists in the fact that we both seem to be aiming at a panentheistic' understanding of the God-w~rld relationship. That is, we both believe that finite entities exist in God and through the power of God. This is what Ramanuja e~idently had in mind with the metaphor of the world as the "body" of God. Likewise, this is what I have in mind with the argument that creatures exist in and through participation in the divine nature or divine act of being. Where we differ, of course, is that for Ramanuja finite entities, at least from one perspective, have no reality except as "modes" or finite manifestations of Brahman or Vi~,!u; for me, on the other' hand, finite entities unambiguously have their own real existence and activity apart from God as a transcendent entity even as they depend on the divine nature for that same existence and activity. In my scheme, accordingly, finite Infinity and the Logic of Non-Dualism 43 entities are less the "body" of God than coexistent members of a cosmic society with God. The unity of the cosmic society, moreover, is not the unity of God as its transcendent member but the dynamic unity brought about by the divine nature as the underlying principle of existence and activity for all the members, God included. It is the unity of a specifically social reality rather than the unity of an individual entity as in Ramanuja's scheme.
To sum up, then, the relationship between the Infinite and the finite would seem to be necessarily non-dual; somehow the Infinite must encompass the finite or it is not really infinite. This would seem to be the enduring insight which a Westerner like myself should gain from pondering the "Great Sayings" out of the Upanishads and the writings of SaIikara and Ramanuja. What this paper, on the other hand, has argued is that there are two distinct options for what one means here by the' Infinite. If the Infinite is understood in quasi-entitative terms, then the position of SaIikara would seem to be logically more consistent than that of either Ramanuja or various Christian theologians like Neville or myself. Because, if an infinite entity is truly "one without a second", then multiplicity is an illusion. All appearances to the contrary notwithstanding, only Brahman really exists.
But, if the Infinite is understood to be an all-comprehensive activity such as Neville and I have urged, then finite entities really . exist and, at least within my scheme, a personal God in dynamic interaction with these finite entities really exists. The governing idea here is that there is a nondual relationship between a universal grounding activity called creativity and the entities which it thereby empowers to exist. Both the grounding activity and the entities really exist unlike the non-dual relationship, first, within Sailkara's scheme between the Absolute Self and ,finite entities in which finite entities ultimately do not exist and then within Ramanuja's scheme in which the relation of finite entities to Brahman or 
